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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we aim at two targets: i) to look for the theoretical roots of the EMU institutions and 
to  check  whether  the  current  economic  doctrine  still  supports  them;  ii)  to  discuss  the 
appropriateness  of  these  institutions  and  the  policies  adopted  by  European  policymakers  in 
order to exit the crisis, specifically with respect to the issues of fiscal policy and public debt. A 
general issue of inappropriateness of institutions arises both sides of the Atlantic. However, in 
Europe the problems raised by the specific nature of the crisis of the private debt have been 
augmented by those of the public debt for reasons again related to the institutional framework.  
The  evolution  of  economic  thought  can  contribute  to  explain  the  differences  between  the 
policies  that  were  adopted  on  the  two  sides  of  the  Atlantic  through  its  influence  on  the 
respective institutions. Time has passed which should have led to a radical change of most of 
the still current institutional architecture, but a sort of hysteresis is in place. This has a number 
of possible explanations, such as those underlined by Galbraith (1987). However, in order to 
explain it one should refer not only to normal and physiological lags, but also the opposing 
interests,  the  value  judgments  and  visions  prevailing  in  some  European  countries  and  the 
dominant role of Germany, which conveys them. 
 
 
Classification JEL: B22, D02, E58, E63 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As is well known, the current crisis started in the USA in 2007 but soon spread to 
Europe. Its (proximate) roots were in the accumulation of private debt, which took 
however  different  aspects  in  the  two  regions.  In  2009  its  pace  began  slowing 
down in the USA as an effect of public intervention while accelerating in Europe 
                                                           
1Department  of  Methods  and  Models  for  Economics,  Territory  and  Finance  –  Sapienza 
University  of  Rome  –  via  del  Castro  Laurenziano  9,  00161  Rome,  Italy  (e-mail:  
nicola.acocella@uniroma1.it). 
Research  underlying  this  paper  is  part  of  research  project  partly  financed  by  Sapienza 
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as  a  public  debt  crisis  emerged  here  on  the  top  of  the  private  debt  one  and 
improper policies were adopted to face them.  
In this paper we aim at two targets: i) to look for the theoretical roots of the EMU 
institutions  and  to  check  whether  the  current  economic  doctrine  still  supports 
them;  ii)  to  discuss  the  appropriateness  of  these  institutions  and  the  policies 
adopted  by  European  policymakers  in  order  to  exit  the  crisis,  specifically  with 
respect to the issues of fiscal policy and public debt. A companion paper deals 
with the way institutions nourished both the private and the public debt crisis in the 
EMU and the different reactions to the financial crisis in the USA and in the EMU 
(Acocella, 2013). 
When  trying  to  explain  the  roots  of  the  crisis  a  general  issue  of 
inappropriateness  of  institutions  arises  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  However,  in 
Europe the problems raised by the specific nature of the crisis of the private debt 
have been augmented by those of the public debt for reasons again related to the 
institutional framework. In addition, the USA institutions have proved to be more 
effective in dealing at least with the short-term effects of the crisis, whereas the 
European ones have shown their profound shortcomings. In fact, in the USA both 
fiscal  and  monetary  policy  have  been  active  in  counteracting  recessionary 
impulses, with a clear Keynesian inspiration. While having this imprint, monetary 
policy has also been innovative, as it has devised various types of unconventional 
measures  that  have  added  to  the  traditional  ones.  Differently  from  policies  in 
Washington, in the EMU, only the Frankfurt pole, i.e. monetary policy, was actively 
expansionary, even if with some hesitation, and to some extent innovative. Fiscal 
policy not only has not offered any expansionary impulse, but has acted in the 
opposite direction, showing a deflationary bias.  
This different reaction across the Atlantic is consistent with the foundations of 
the EMU institutions set up by the Maastricht Accords of the early 1990s. These 
were born out of a number of de facto circumstances, but drew support from the 
theories prevailing in the couple of decades after Friedman (1968), which had 
been widely applied in Anglo-Saxon countries in the Eighties
2. While analyses of 
the former aspect (in terms of political relations between the different participating 
countries, their relative bargaining powers and interests, the necessities deriving 
from the impossible ‘trilogy’ and other considerations relative to the benefits of 
complementing  a  the  single  market  with  a  single  currency)  are  relatively 
abundant
3,  systematically  relating  the  birth  of  EMU  institutions  to  the  then 
prevailing theoretical ideas is a task largely  neglected in the economic literature, 
                                                           
2  According  to  Stiglitz  (2013b),  ‘Much  of  the  euro’s  design  reflects  the  neoliberal  economic 
doctrines that prevailed when the single currency was conceived. It was thought that keeping 
inflation low was necessary and almost sufficient for growth and stability; that making central 
banks independent was the only way to ensure confidence in the monetary system; that low 
debt and deficits would ensure economic convergence among member countries; and that a 
single market, with money and people flowing freely, would ensure efficiency and stability.’ 
3  The literature on this is rather ample. We can simply refer to Gros, Thygesen (1993), 
Eichengreen (1993), Wyplosz (1997), Feldste in (1997).  For a recent survey of the political 
aspects of the European integration see Spolaore, 2013.  
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possibly because some analysts think of the European institutional set up as of a 
‘bricolage  of  odds  and  ends’  (Collignon,  2001:25).  Buti  (2003)  offers  a  first 
theoretical justification of this set up, but does not cover some aspects of this and, 
obviously, misses consideration of the new results of the past decade. Beetsma, 
Giuliodori  (2010)  has  the  advantage  of  a  more  recent  viewpoint  on  the 
macroeconomic costs and benefits of the EMU institutional architecture, but pays 
less attention to the state of the art supporting it. Finally, Schelke (2013) is very 
good at indicating the basic theoretical roots of EMU institutions but lacks details 
and updates.  
A related exercise that is worth trying is to check the validity of the European 
institutions in the light of the developments of the literature after mid-Eighties. We 
will show that  the EMU institutional design seems to be no longer justified on 
these terms, i.e. with respect to current theories, which have countered almost all 
the  conclusions  of  monetarism  and  new  classical  macroeconomics.
4  This  is 
particularly so in the realm of fiscal policy,  the value of multipliers and policies 
needed for debt consolidation for which the fallacy of conceptions popular a 
couple of decades ago has been shown. Theoretical advances are in profound 
contrast with stickiness of European institutions and the persistence of unsound 
policies. This raises the issue whether there are different explanations - in terms, 
e.g., of the opposing interests of the member states and their relative bargaining 
power - for the continuation of the old route. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After having briefly described the 
specific  evolution  of  the  crisis  in  the  EMU  and  linked  it  to  the  Eurozone’s 
institutional  architecture  (section  2),  we  trace  this  architecture  back  to  the 
monetarist and new-classical macroeconomic theories that got wide acceptance 
from the end of the 1960s (section 3). In section 4 we show that in the last two 
decades or so all the pillars of such theories have been demolished, whereas the 
original EMU institutions are still there almost untouched. Critical to the existence 
of  the deflationary bias  of European institutions and  policies  were studies that 
predicated low values of income multipliers (section 5). This credence has now 
been shown  to be incorrect (section  6), which no longer justifies its persistent 
influx, in particular in so far as devising policies for exiting the crisis is concerned 
(section  7).  We  then  direct  our  attention  to  other  possible  explanatory  factors 
(section 8). Section 9 concludes. 
 
 
2. THE CRISIS  
 
In  Europe  the  financial  crisis  sprouted  under  forms  very  different  from  those 
characterizing  the  United  States.  This  was  due  both  to  the  different  type  of 
financial  system  and  to  the  specific  financial  and  macroeconomic  imbalances 
between the different EMU countries that had loomed un-tackled: some member 
                                                           
4 According to Stiglitz (2013b), each of the doctrines on which the EMU institutions where built 
‘has proved to be wrong.’  
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countries, with specific structural features and higher inflation rates, experienced 
current account deficits and  accumulated  (private) debt towards other member 
countries. Such imbalances were built into the existence of a uniform monetary 
policy  that  led  to  differences  in  the  real  rates  of  interests  in  the  presence  of 
structural  divergences  among  the  member  countries.  The  mechanism  creating 
imbalances was self-reinforcing. In fact, free capital inflows and external financing 
of banks nourished a speculative boom in constructions and financial assets that 
added  to  inflation.  Absence  of  common  policies,  such  as  wage  and  industrial 
policy, financial regulation, etc. made it possible for the bubble to grow and burst 
as soon as the financial crisis imported from the USA erupted. To save financial 
intermediaries required intervention of national governments and an increase in 
public deficits, thus threatening the whole European financial system. 
There was no sign of significant public debt tensions before the crisis, with the 
partial exception of Greece. The debt/Gdp ratio in the Union had indeed lowered. 
Tensions within the EMU exploded almost by chance – in the case of Greece, 
when the new government disclosed its predecessor's misconduct – or as a direct 
consequence of the crisis and the need for government intervention to cope with 
it,  as  in  Ireland.  Expectations  of  insolvency  then  arose.  The  Greek  and  Irish 
shocks could have been smoothly absorbed, with no domino effect, had a federal 
government  – or at least some kind of coordinated expansionary fiscal  action, 
instead of the constraints deriving from the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and 
the  Treaty  on  Stability,  Coordination  and  Governance  in  the  Economic  and 
Monetary Union (usually referred to as ‘fiscal compact’)
5 – and a non-conservative 
central bank acting as a lender of last resort to governments been in place.  
Each country having to deal with the effects of private debt crisis implied that 
many  countries  had  to  expand  their  budget  deficits
6.  But in  the  process,  as  a 
public debt crisis began to loom and as, again, the approach to this crisis was at 
the level of each country, with scarce involvement of the EMU level, each country 
took  a  contractionary  fiscal  stance.  This  aimed  at  reducing  the  size  of  the 
deficit/GDP  and  debt/GDP  ratios  and  warding  off  insolvency,  which  financial 
markets related to these ratios. However, simultaneous contraction by practically 
all member countries implied an increase – rather than a reduction – in the ratios, 
as  not  only  the  numerators  of  the  ratios,  but  also  their  denominator  were 
eventually lowered, more than proportionally.  
                                                           
5 As is well known, the SGP was agreed on in 1997, since the EMU was created. The fiscal 
compact, instead, was decided in 2011. 
6 Generally speaking, an increase in private debt should trigger a build -up in government debt, 
according to the debt deflation dynamics analyzed by Fisher (1933) and Minsky (1982). As De 
Grauwe (2010: 3) notes, this occurs through two channels: first, governments relieve banks of 
their debt; and second, the public deficit increases by reason of automatic stabilizers and 
Keynesian discretionary policies. Alter , Beyer (2013) construct contagion indices based on 
measures for aggregated spillover effects. Results of their empirical estimates show growing 
interdependencies between banks and sovereigns, which represents a potential source of 
systemic risk.  
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Both the roots of the crisis and the type of policies implemented to face it lie in 
the institutional set up of the EMU. We have no enough space here to deal with 
these issues and concentrate on the theoretical sources of the EMU institutions
7. 
 
 
3.  THE  THEORETICAL  FOUNDATIONS  OF  EMU  INSTITUTIONS:  THE  VIRTUES  OF  MARKETS  IN  A  CURRENCY 
UNION  
 
As seen in the previous section, the institutional architecture of the EMU has been 
characterized until recently by the existence of only one common institution, the 
ECB, and absence or weakness of other common institutions in fields such as 
financial regulation, wage policy, regional and industrial policy. The role that could 
be played by such common institutions, where the term institution is meant to refer 
to agents or ‘organisations’, is taken over by rules, i.e. institutions as a set of 
relationships or behavioral patterns of agents. The  basic rule which the Union 
relies on is the market: the working of markets is intended as to offer the basic 
mechanism for regulating the economic activity within the Union. Other rules aim 
at constraining the action both of the only common public institution and of the 
countries’  governments. The former  is  expressed  by  the  choice  of  a model  of 
independent and conservative central bank. The latter by the SGP. 
In this and the following two sections we deal with these two ideas that seem to 
be central in the EMU construction: the conviction of the possibility of markets to 
solve problems, on the one side, and the need for constraining the action of public 
agents, on the other.  
By looking at the report ‘One market, one money’ (and the background studies 
prepared for it) that evaluates the benefits and costs of the EMU, one can see 
how profoundly this assessment and the track suggested for monetary unification 
were  influenced  by  the  then  dominant  theories  (European  Commission,  1990, 
1991). Buti (2003) explicitly recognizes the importance of the debate in the 1970s 
and 1980s on the EMU construction, in addition to the decisive influence of the 
national  central  banks,  and  in  particular  of  the  Bundesbank.  The  theoretical 
foundations of EMU institutions can thus be traced back, apart from the theory of 
optimal currency areas (OCA), to a number of analytical contributions introduced, 
mostly, since the second half of the 1960s up to mid-1980s. 
However, having to do with an array of rules that were agreed upon in a rather 
long period of time, partially as a result of compromises and bargaining, this can 
be done only in an approximate way and more than one theoretical result can 
often  be  linked  to  the  real  institutional  architecture  that  has  been  devised. 
Therefore there are several possible rationales for this institutional set up. The 
basic idea is that benefits can be derived from the implementation of free markets. 
Simply adding a single money to a unitary market solves most problems deriving 
from the (possibly) diverging conduct of private agents and keeps undisciplined 
agents  in  line.  However,  given  the  power  of  command  of  public  agents,  the 
                                                           
7 For a more detailed review see Acocella (2013).  
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ineffectiveness of their instruments as well as the potential dangers that can result 
from their use, ruling their conduct is necessary.  
The  basic  inspiration  of  EMU  lies  in  Mundell’s  (1961)  approach  to  OCA. 
Obviously  enough, both direct and  indirect  benefits  can  accrue from  monetary 
unification. However, also costs can arise, especially from the point of view of 
specific countries. In order to avoid them, in the case of asymmetric shocks, some 
conditions must be fulfilled acting as a substitute of the instrument of exchange 
rate variation, which can no longer be used. An obvious condition is the existence 
of government transfers to the countries hit by such shocks from those that are 
not. In the absence of a federal state, another equilibrating mechanism, offered by 
markets  could  help  to  avoid  the  costs  of  asymmetric  shocks,  i.e.  flexibility  of 
wages and prices and/or labour mobility. 
Flexibility of prices in product markets, in principle, should be ensured by free 
circulation  of  goods  and  the  elimination  of  non-tariff  barriers  deriving  from  the 
Single  Market  coming  into  force  since  January  1
st,  1993.  Other  measures  of 
liberalisation in the service markets would have completed the picture of free and 
open markets throughout Europe, that would lead to an optimal performance of 
the EMU. Flexibility of wages might be problematic for the reasons we will deal 
with below. If, however, the outcome of scarcely flexible wages is unemployment, 
labour  mobility  across  countries  could  guarantee  proper  working  of  the  labour 
market.  
Then, at least in principle, the countries adopting a single currency could have 
been ensured the possibility to avoid the costs deriving from asymmetric shocks. 
From a practical point of view, there may be an insufficient degree of flexibility in 
labour markets. Obtaining flexibility is then a requisite for the functioning of the 
monetary union and becomes a policy target
8. 
From another point of view,  the possibility for countries entering the currency 
union to ensure benefits, at no cost, by relying on well-functioning markets derives 
from the fact that each country loses an instrument (exchange rate variations), but 
is also relieved of one target (or constraint), that of current account (or, more 
generally, of the balance of payment s) equilibrium (Blanchard, Giavazzi, 2002). 
An argument can be put forward that is even more  in favour of participating to a 
currency union. This was first introduced with reference to participation to the 
European Monetary System (EMS) established in 1979: giving up exchange rate 
variations would introduce an external constraint favouring a virtuous conduct of 
both public and private agents. Governments of high-inflation countries would tie 
their  (inflationary)  hands by committing to a fixed exchange rate   with lower-
inflation countries (Giavazzi, Pagano, 1988; Sibert, 1999; see also Carli, 1996). 
Thus, monetary policy would credibly
9  be delegated to an external entity and 
private agents would no longer expect their government to inflate the economy 
                                                           
8 ‘The original Mundell argument, of real wage flexibility as a precondition for an OCA, was thus 
turned  on  its  head:  rather  than  being  an  OCA  at  the  beginning,  Member  States  must 
implement deep institutional reforms in order to become an OCA’ (Schelke, 2013: 40). 
9 The importance of the concept of credibility for understainding the foundations of the EMU will 
be clear shortly.   
 
8 
 
and would act consistently. As a consequence they would adjust their conduct and 
rely on instruments other than higher mark-ups to pursue their revenue or profit 
targets.
10 
 
 
4. GOVERNMENT IS THE BEAST: FINDING THE APPROPRIATE SETTING FOR THE CENTRAL BANK 
 
In the vision of the EMU architects problems do not come from markets, which 
should indeed be freed of any obstacle (or at least of regulations and obstacles 
deriving from the government action
11). They come from the  discretionary action 
of public agents, as  in each time period  these tend to pursue  targets that are 
unattainable in the presence of private agents having either backward- or forward-
looking expectations. In attempting to get their objectives, governments are fooled 
by the private sector, and a suboptimal outcome results. Discretionary monetary 
and fiscal policy are ineffective with respect to real variables  and the first best 
desired by public agents can never be obtained, but complying to some kind of 
rules can at least ensure a second- -best outcome. 
 
 
4.1. The role of monetary policy 
 
In  more  technical  terms,  monetary  policy  aiming  at  higher  employment  and 
income  is  ineffective  in  the  long  run,  when  there  is  no  trade-off  between 
unemployment and inflation (the long-run Phillips curve is vertical) (Phelps, 1967; 
Friedman 1968). Thus any monetary expansion trying to reduce the ‘market’ rate 
of unemployment below the ‘natural’ one is doomed to failure and can only cause 
inflation
12.  Monetary policy should pursue  a target of monetary stability, rather 
than  try to  influence  real variables.  This  can  explain why the ECB has been 
assigned a monetary target (price stability) instead of a dual or multiple mandate, 
as in the case of Federal Reserve.  To be sure,  price stability would not be the 
proper  objective,  as  the  Friedman  (1969)  rule  must  be  obeyed,  which  should 
ensure (at least in a completely flexible price context) a zero nominal interest rate 
and a deflation rate equal to the real interest rate on safe assets
13. The decision 
taken by the ECB  to choose an inflation target less, but close to, 2%  – then a 
positive one – is only apparently contrary to the Friedman rule, as in reality prices 
are not completely flexible and hedonic prices may be of some importance
14.  
                                                           
10 A note of cautiousness is however offered by Ozkan, Sibert and Sutherland (1999). 
11 What G. Carli called “‘lacci’ and ‘lacciuoli’” (see Carli, 2003). 
12 In any case, discretionary monetary policy can even aggravate cyclical oscillations because 
of a long and variable effect time lag. Then rules must be adhered to in monetary action 
(Friedman, 1960).  
13 This will be relevant when it comes to explaining why the ECB has chosen an inflation target 
less, but close to, 2%. 
14 On the relevance of price and wage adjustment costs to depart from the Friedman rule see 
Schmitt-Grohé, Uribe, 2004.  
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The issue of the independence of the ECB seems however more remote from 
Friedman’s  thought.  In  his  opinion  attributing  the  central  bank  an  independent 
status is a second-best option, for political as well as for economic considerations. 
In so far as the latter are concerned, rules are preferable to independence, as the 
main objectives of monetary policy are to avoid money itself to be a factor of major 
disturbances in the system and to offer a stable background for the economy
15. It 
is true that his objections to independence refer to a situation where the central 
bank is given ‘a good deal of separate power’, whereas the ECB is governed by a 
rule (i.e. an inflation target). However, this rule must be obeyed to in the medium 
run, which implies that cyclical manipulations of the interest rate (or the monetary 
base)  are  not  only  possible,  but  also  desirable.  This  is  exactly  the  kind  of 
monetary conduct Friedman wanted to avoid (Friedman, 1962). 
We must thus refer to theoretical foundations of the ECB organization and target 
other than Friedman’s thought, even if Friedman’s (1962) argument contains the 
seeds of further thought justifying an independent and conservative central bank. 
This anticipation of further developments can be linked to one of the arguments he 
makes use of, in particular, when, in the case of an independent central banker, 
he is critic of the uncertain degree and the personality of those in charge with 
monetary control, who may or may not give an assurance of a steady and firm 
conduct. This argument preludes to the assertion of the virtues of commitment 
and  of  a  conservative  central  banker,  which  are  linked  to  the  passage  from 
backward- to forward-looking expectations. 
 
 
4.2.  Rational  expectations,  the  neutrality  proposition  and  the  need  for  a 
conservative central bank 
 
Introduction  of  rational  expectations  (REs)  led,  first,  to  a  statement  of  the 
ineffectiveness of monetary policy that was even more forceful than that stated by 
Friedman  (Sargent  and Wallace,  1975).  Similarly,  with  rational forward looking 
expectations, fiscal policy was considered to be ineffective as an instrument for 
managing income levels (Barro, 1974), a result we will consider into detail shortly. 
A proposition of policy neutrality or policy ‘invariance’ was thus stated with regard 
to  the  two  most  important  macroeconomic  policy  instruments.  From  a  more 
general point of view Lucas (1976) showed that if the private sector has REs, it 
can fool any attempt by either the central bank or the government to pursue a 
given target for any real variable through the use of any instrument. 
In  the  same  vein,  any  promise  by  governments  that  is  time  inconsistent  is 
deemed to be not credible by private agents having forward-looking expectations 
(Kydland,  Prescott,  1977).  This  result    can  be  avoided  by  self-restraint  of  the 
policymaker, whose temptation to cheat is balanced by a fear that he might lose 
                                                           
15  Most  recently,  J.  B.  Taylor  reaches  very  similar  conclusion  with  respect  to  the  issue  of 
independence vs rules: ‘In the absence of a rules-based framework it appears that formal 
Federal Reserve independence does not generate good monetary policy outcomes’ (Taylor, 
2013: 17).  
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his  reputation  and  no  longer  be  able  to  act  effectively,  in  case  of  repeated 
interactions with the private sector. However, in a world with uncertainty, signals 
are more difficult to interpret and then the best practical solution to the problem of 
time inconsistency is that the policymaker credibly commits to some rule (Barro, 
Gordon, 1983)
16.  
In order to eliminate this tendency to create inflation, the inflation bias, that may 
be present in the  constituency and the government,  many possible rules have 
been suggested, such as  those tying money growth to some macroeconomic 
indicator.  An  alternative   is  for  the  constituency  or  government   to  delegate 
monetary  policy  to   a  conservative  central  banker,  i.e.  a  banker  assigning 
employment a lower weight than the society’s or the government’s. Rogoff (1985) 
shows that this will be able to attain a lower level of inflation without reducing 
employment.  However,  appointing  a  conservative  central  banker  introduces  a 
conflict with the government that can be avoided by introducing rules that govern 
the  independent  monetary  authority,  i.e.  by  establishing  a  target  conservative 
central  bank  (Svensson,  1997).  These  represent  the  best  way  for  obtaining  a 
commitment  not  to  pursue  inflationary,  but  ineffective,  policies.  We  are  thus 
(almost) back to Friedman, with two (not insignificant) details added: one is that 
rules are a way to cope with a more general problem faced by governments, that 
of  their  credibility:  the  other  is  that,  once  price  stability  is  not  in  question, 
stabilization policies are possible. But this is exactly the description of the status of 
the ECB, which has to guarantee a certain inflation rate in the medium run as its 
pre-eminent target, but can also pursue other objectives, provided that these do 
not prejudge the attainment of its predominant one. 
 
 
5. AGAINST DISCRETIONARY AND CO-ORDINATED FISCAL ACTION  
 
The rules for fiscal policy set by the EMU (introduction of the responsibility for it of 
each country and no coordination among the member countries, limits to budget 
deficits and public debts) have numerous theoretical roots, apart from the need for 
commitment  and  adoption  of  rules,  as  an  effect  of  time  inconsistency,  an 
argument that can be applied not only to monetary policy, but also to any other 
public action.  
By referring to political economy contributions, which we do in sub-section 5.1, 
one can first have an analytical justification for the assumption underlying Barro, 
Gordon’s  (1983)  model,  according  to  which  the  government’s  desired 
unemployment rate is lower than the natural one. In this way one goes to the roots 
of time inconsistency. In addition, this literature can explain the tendency towards 
accumulation  of  public  deficit  and  debt.  This  offers  an  additional  specific 
justification for constraints imposed on discretionary fiscal action.  
                                                           
16  The  pay-offs  to  a  long-term  player  whose  preferences  are  uncertain  to  his  short-term 
opponent and mimicking a committed player are practically equivalent to those deriving from 
commitment (Fudenberg, Levine, 1992; Schmidt, 1993; Cripps, Thomas, 1994).  
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The ineffectiveness of this action due to ultra-rationality (Barro, 1974) and the 
low  values  of  multipliers  deriving  from  time  inconsistency  and  rational 
expectations go in the same direction (see sub-section 5.2).  
Finally, the possible negative influence of coordinated fiscal action on the price 
level and the capacity of monetary counter-action, which are the object of sub-
section 5.3, justify absence of fiscal coordination and application of the principle of 
subsidiarity to this matter.  
 
 
5.1. Limiting the populistic tendencies of governments 
 
Having  referred  to  the  concepts  of  political  conflicts,  rational  expectations  and 
commitment for explaining the theoretical bases of the monetary policy set up in 
the  EMU  is  useful  for  understanding  other  institutional  aspects  of  the  Union, 
namely introduction of fiscal policy rules. 
We  have  dealt  with  the  conflict  between  monetary  and  fiscal  authorities  en 
passant,  almost  incidentally,  in  the  previous  section.  Consideration  of  political 
motivations is needed in order to explain this situation not as a possible curiosum, 
but  as  a  real  one,  deriving  from  the  need  to  limit  populistic  tendencies  of 
politicians who aim at maintaining or gaining power.  
These  tendencies  have  first  been  explained  by  the  school  of  public  choice, 
starting from the idea of the political process as determined by a collection of self-
interested  decisions  (Buchanan,  Tullock,  1962).  This  applies  not  only  to 
politicians, but also to other agents. In so far as politicians are concerned, the 
attempt to maximize the length of their office (Downs 1957) or to win elections 
(Nordhaus,1975), their partisan inclinations (Hibbs, 1977; Wittman, 1977) or their 
representation  of  interest  groups  can  lead  them  to  attempt  to  reach  a  higher 
employment  target  than  the  natural  one,  to  run  budget  deficits,  to  accumulate 
public debt, etc.
17 This is possible if there arise principal -agent problems, as an 
effect of ‘rational ignorance’ (Downs, 1957) or asymmetric information (also Dixit, 
1996)
18. To be sure, similar problems affect not only macroeconomic policies but 
also the provision of public goods and are particularly important if the principal is 
composed of a large group of individuals (Olson, 1965). Also the kind of electoral 
system  chosen,  e.g.  proportional  representation,  or  electoral  uncertainty  can 
exacerbate the tendency to enlarge expenditures and deficits.
19 
The need then arises of devising rules, especially  constitutional ones,  to be 
decided by following a unanimity procedure. Quasi-rational individuals could agree 
to limit the temptation to draw short -run benefits and agree on such subjects as 
balanced budget rules, limits   to governmental growth and transfer s  (Brennan, 
Buchanan, 1980;  Buchanan, Brennan, 1981). One could thus explain  both the 
                                                           
17 A rather complete review of the political economy literature in the years before the late 1980s 
is in Tabellini, Alesina (1988). The most notable exception in their survey is the ‘public choice’ 
literature. Alesina, Tabellini (1990) explain the bias to accumulating deficits and debt.  
18 As is well known, the literature on asymmetric information was inaugurated by Akerlof (1970). 
19 There is a wide literature on the subject (see Arnott, 2006).   
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reason why the SGP was required to be constitutionally grounded (Inman, 1996)
20 
and the recent provision of the fiscal compact according to which constitutional 
rules constraining discretionary fiscal policy should be passed. 
In  addition,  this  literature  gives  support  to  transferring  some  decisions  to 
institutions  not  plagued  by  time  inco nsistency  and  opportunistic  behavior  to 
acquire  credible  commitment  by  delegating  some  decisions  to  agents  with 
different time preferences or with incentive structures different from those of 
politicians as in the case of independent central banks  (De Haan, Sturm, 1992, 
Cukierman,  1994,  Akhtar,  1995)  and  independent  authorities   (Majone,  1994, 
1996). 
 
 
5.2. Ineffectiveness of fiscal policy: low value of multipliers 
 
The neoclassical and New Keynesian approach
21 that incorporate some sort of 
Barro-Ricardo (consumption smoothing) effect  – and thus assert a low value of 
multipliers  –  tend  to  suggest  fiscal  policy  ineffectiveness  for  expansionary 
purposes and, in the case of a crisis, the need for fiscal contraction. Even in these 
neoclassical  and  New  Keynesian  models,  separable  utility,  deep  habits 
consumption, rule-of-thumb consumers, spending reversals could restore positive 
and  significant  Keynesian-like  effects  of  public  spending  increases  on  output 
(Hebous, 2010). In the absence of such mechanisms some kind of Barro-Ricardo 
effect would not only imply ineffectiveness of Keynesian policies, but also suggest 
the  need  for  fiscal  consolidation,  under  the  form  either  of  a  reduction  in 
expenditures  or  of  a  rise  in  taxes
22. This suggestion would be streng thened 
considering also the negative long term effect of debt on growth.  
Indeed,  some  empirical  researches  found  a  positive  effect  of  government 
expenditure  cuts  both  in  a  short -  and  a  long -run  perspective.  This  was  the 
conclusion of Giavazzi, Pagano (199 0), who explained the positive effects on 
consumption of the cuts of the 1980s in the Danish and Irish public expenditure as 
deriving  from  households’  expectations  of  permanent  cuts  in  the  level  of 
government budget. Along similar lines followed Alesina, Perotti (1995a, 1997), 
Giavazzi, Pagano (1996)
23. The negative effect of the debt on growth had been 
stated  –  long  before  Reinhart,  Rogoff  (2010),  Checherita,  Rother,  2010;  and 
Kumar, Woo (2010) –by Modigliani (1961), Diamond (1965), Saint-Paul (1992). 
                                                           
20 This was not the real outcome for the SGP, and constitutionalisation of the fiscal rules has to 
wait  until  the  fiscal  compact,  whose  enforcement  could  also  be  ensured  by  the  European 
Court of Justice.  
21 The New Keynesian approach emerged first at the beginning of the 1990s, but it was not until 
the 2000s that it was refined in a way as to allow for some positive real effect of fiscal policy. 
Then it had no practical influence on EMU institutions different from that of other neocla ssical 
theories. 
22 Fiscal consolidation has limited relevance in the SGP but will be a central aspect of the ‘fiscal 
compact’. 
23 More recently, see Barro, Redlick (2009), Alesina, Ardagna (1998, 2010), Broadbent, Daly 
(2010).  
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This ‘fin de siècle’ credo of low or negative values of multipliers and of negative 
effects  on  growth  deriving  from  the  accumulation  of  debt  was  certainly  not  in 
favour of traditional Keynesian fiscal action and imbalances and can be thought as 
influencing the draft of the EMU institutional set up. In addition, it has also inspired 
the  idea  of an expansionary  fiscal  consolidation (the  doctrine  of ‘expansionary 
austerity’) that has been at the basis of exit policies from the crisis (see section 7).   
In  this  perspective  it  is  not  strange  that  active  fiscal  policy  had  been  put  in 
plaster by the SGP and (more recently) the European fiscal compact has been 
agreed  on.  But  these  limitations  on  discretionary  fiscal  policy  cannot  be  fully 
understood without considering open economies explicitly, in the context of other 
European institutions, which we do in the following sub-section. 
 
5.3. Inefficiency and negative spillovers of fiscal policy coordination 
 
Theoretical  models  of  open  economies  are  of  specific  interest  to  us.  In  this 
context,  the  impact  of  budget  policies  on  the  real  exchange  rate  plays  an 
important  role  in  determining  the  size  of  the multiplier effect,  as  this  could  be 
increased by the real exchange rate depreciation
24. Also other effects must be 
taken  into  account  in  an  open  economy,  such  as  existence  of  incomplete 
international financial markets (Kollman, 2009) and the possibility of a home bias 
in  consumption  (Ravn,  Schmitt -Grohé  and  Uribe,  2007):  both  increase  the 
expansionary impact of public expenditur e.  In an open-economy context also 
positive spillover effects operating via trade have a special interest. Beetsma et al. 
(2006, 2009, 2011) explore the international spillovers from fiscal policy shocks in 
Europe. A fiscal expansion stimulates domestic ac tivity, which leads to more 
foreign exports and, hence, higher foreign output. Erceg, Gust and Lopez Salido 
(2007) and Spilimbergo, Symansky, Blanchard and Cottarelli (2008) argue in fact 
that fiscal coordination increases multiplier effects. 
Some of these effects are scarcely relevant in the context of the EMU. In fact, 
changes in the real exchange rate are possible only to the extent to which the 
price level can be lowered in the country with an expansionary fiscal policy, which 
contradicts what one should expect to happen in a monetary union. Also the home 
bias is limited in the EU in so far as the effect of national protectionist policies is 
concerned, as both trade and non-trade barriers were drastically lifted. In fact, the 
income multiplier is reduced by the high value of the propensity to import from 
other EU countries. This high propensity, instead, while having a negative impact 
on  expansionary  fiscal  action  in  one  country  only,  would  per  se  support  a 
coordinated fiscal action.  
                                                           
24 The possibility of this outcome is investigated by: Frankel, Razin (1987), who assume tax 
financing of public expenditures and an exogenous supply of money; Obstfeld, Rogoff (1995), 
who  consider  circumstances  leading  to  an  interest  rate  reduction,  namely  short-run  price 
rigidities  and  consumption  smoothing;  Corsetti,  Meier  and  Muller  (2009),  who  point  to 
expectations of a systematic reduction over time of future government spending that preclude 
a real interest rate rise  
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This conclusion misses interactions between fiscal and monetary policies, which 
have an impact on the nature and the value of spillovers and fiscal multipliers. In a 
monetary  union  such  as  the  EMU  assigning  monetary  authorities  the  primary 
target of price stability implies a negative spillover of fiscal policy: in fact, any 
expansionary fiscal action by one country has an impact on the union’s price level 
and thus calls for a deflationary intervention by the ECB. Beetsma, Bovenberg 
(1998),  Beetsma,  Uhlig  (1999),  Beetsma  et  al.  (2001)
25, while using different 
modelling approaches,
26 all find negative effects on income from fully-coordinated 
fiscal expansion, due to the deflationary reaction of the central bank.  
According to Beetsma, Bovenberg (1998), in a mone tary union such as the 
EMU, time inconsistency provides the rationale for a conservative central bank 
and against the coordination of national fiscal policies. In fact, in their analysis, the 
system suffers from both a spending bias and an inflation bias a nd thus faces a 
trade-off between them. By adjusting either monetary or fiscal institutions, not 
both, only a suboptimal outcome can result. Monetary unification enhances the 
strategic position of the monetary authority and introduces a disciplinary effect on 
governments.  Fiscal  coordination  would  eliminate  this  disciplinary  effect  and 
worsen  the  strategic  position  of  the  central  bank.  The  need  for  introducing 
subsidiarity in fiscal policymaking is thus asserted. 
The only problem left is then whether existe nce of a committed central bank 
alone  and  national fiscal  authorities can avoid  the  negative  effects  on price 
stability  of  free -riding  by  the  latter
27  or  if  other  institutions  are  needed  to 
complement the type of central bank that has been chosen. Beetsma,  Uhlig 
(1999) claim that a pact of the kind of the SGP can reduce the negative spillovers 
arising from political distortions that can be exacerbated in a monetary union.
28 
Beetsma, Uhlig (1999) give two possible justifications for constraining the action of 
national fiscal policy: one refers to a country, closed or open, which wants to draft 
a fiscal constitutional rule in order to tie the hands of its own government , based 
on the arguments developed in sub-section 5.1); the other lies in the existence, in 
a monetary union, of negative spillovers deriving from a country’s budgetary policy 
and accumulation of debt on the common inflation rate.  
The same problem, i.e.  sufficiency  of  a  committed  central  bank for  ensuring 
price stability, has been investigated from another point of view. The ‘unpleasant 
monetarist  arithmetic’  of  Sargent,  Wallace  (1981)  held  first  the  view  of  the 
insufficiency  of  a  monetary  policy  rule  for  price  stability,  due  to  rational 
expectations.  Given  this  kind  of  expectations,  bond  financing  of  public 
expenditures and tight money could give rise to immediate inflation. Along similar 
                                                           
25 And, more recently, Beetsma (2008), Beetsma, Giuliodori (2010), Michalak, Engwerda and 
Plasmans (2009). 
26 Michalak, Engwerda and Plasmans (2009) use a New Keynesian model in continuous time, 
whereas the other papers cited do not use micro-founded models. 
27 See also, more recently, Chari, Kehoe (2007, 2008). 
28 This issue is reviewed at length in Beetsma, Giuliodori (2010: section 7).  
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lines Woodford (1996) applied the fiscal theory of the price level
29 to the case of 
the EMU and, in the absence of fiscal self-discipline of governments, found that it 
supported introduction of limits to public deficit and debt as a way to complement 
the monetary rule chosen by the common central bank  – or even to set up a 
precondition for this bank to be charged with maintaining price stability.  
A final justification for setting limits to national fiscal policy in the context of a 
common monetary system was suggested by Casella (1989): a country’s fiscal 
deficit has negative spillovers on the interest rates and the bonds’ prices of the 
area and should then be limited.  
Then, in the years preceding the constitution of the EMU the rationales were laid 
for advocating rules setting constraints to discretionary fiscal policy. These were:  
1. time inconsistency; 
2. political economy considerations about the attempts of governments to force 
the unemployment rate below the natural one; 
3. ineffectiveness of fiscal action, with possibly negative multipliers and effects 
of accumulated public debt on growth; 
4. negative spillovers on the real interest rates abroad; 
5. negative spillovers on the price level, aggravated by policy coordination and 
the ensuing monetary policy counter-reaction.  
The SGP was only the legal transposition of such statements, reflecting the idea 
that  the  true  problems  of  the  EMU  set  up  were not  only  that  of  designing  an 
independent  and  conservative  central  bank  but  also  of  ensuring  that  no  harm 
could derive from fiscal policy
30.  
 
 
6. RIP VAN WINKLE AND THE REBUTTAL OF THE THEORETICAL CONVICTIONS OF THE 1970S AND 1980S 
 
6.1. Disproving the basic theoretical convictions underlying the EMU institutions 
 
Only  a  few  economists  and  observers
31  warned at the time about  –  or  have 
pointed out later – the fragility or the limits of this project. Almost a decade ago 
Alan Blinder claimed that ‘a sharp revision of the naively optimistic views (about 
the capacity of economic policy to control the economy) held by some economists 
circa 1966 was called for. But … the pendulum may have swung just a bit too far‘ 
                                                           
29 The theory had been developed by Leeper (1991), Sims (1994). For a critique see Buiter 
(2002). 
30 Buti (2003: 5) quotes Mervyn King as saying that the real obsession of central bankers is  not 
inflation but fiscal policy (King, 1995). 
31 See Eichengreen, Frieden (2000). For the practical absence of anti -cyclical policies and the 
limitation of the European budget see Buiter, Corsetti, Roubini (1993). For perverse incentives 
leading to self-realizing speculative attack created by the Maastricht Treaty see Eichengreen, 
Wyplosz (1993); on the compromises between different positions leading to the Treaty see 
Bini  Smaghi,  Padoa  Schioppa,  Papadia  (1994);  on  the  issue  of  coordination  between 
monetary and fiscal policy see also the largely or partly critical contributions by Bryson (1994), 
Allsopp, Vines (1996), Dixit, Lambertini (2001), Onorante (2006).  
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(Blinder, 2004: 26), producing a similar naively optimistic views about the virtues 
of markets and the central bank conservativeness. 
Blinder’s words are even more actual nowadays as economic theory has further 
questioned the system of beliefs that had emerged in the fifteen-twenty years or 
so after 1966, even if it still retains some assumptions that led to the propositions 
featuring that credo. Three decades later, Rip van Winkle’s
32 faith in the credo 
would again be crowded out by the analytical developments intervened in these 
years. Think of: the limited practical relevance of the surprise effect, recognized by 
Lucas  (1996:  679)  himself;  the  irrelevance  of  many  critiques  to  the  ‘classical’ 
theory of economic policy (in particular, Tinbergen’s ‘golden rule’ about controlling 
the  economy)  based  on  rational  expectations  (Blinder,  1998:  8;  Acocella,  Di 
Bartolomeo, Hughes Hallett, 2012
33); the theoretical and practical limits to time 
inconsistency  and  thus  to  related  prescriptions  of monetary  policy  rules that 
should replace discretionary action (Blinder , 1998: 56); existence of a long -run 
non  vertical  Phillips  curve  (Hughes  Hallett,  2000;  Graham,  Snower,  2008; 
Benigno, Ricci, 2011; Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, Tirelli, 2013); the need for more 
active  fiscal  policy  and  regulation  (especially  of  financial  mark ets  and 
institutions
34) once some unrealistic assumptions of current models are ruled 
out
35; critique of the arguments put forward by Rogoff (1985) (and Bade, Parkin, 
1978 before him) advanced by Posen (1994) and Hayo (1998), who highlight that 
both political independence and inflation are the outcome of structural economic 
and social factors that make the central bank statutes to have no impact on 
inflation; empirical findings suggesting that countries that adopt inflation targeting 
have not attained better monetary policy performance relative to a control group of 
highly successful non-inflation targeters  (Mishkin, Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007);  sub-
optimality of a conservative central bank in a monetary union with active trade 
                                                           
32 Rip van Winkle is the character created by Washington Irvin and evoked by Gordon (1976) 
who  made  a  terrible  ‘environmental’  mistake  awaking  up  in  the  republican  America,  after 
sleeping for twenty-years, by declaring himself a devote subject of King George III.  
33  Public action can be facilitated by rational expectations. In what circumstances this can 
happen depends on the number of targets and that of the instruments available to the 
government and the private sector (Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, Hughes Hallett, 2012). When the 
policymaker has a sufficient number of instruments available he can make use of appropriate 
announcements of future policies (e.g., to exercise what the Federal Reserve calls ‘forward 
guidance’:  see  Woodford,  2007,  2008;  Williams,  2011)  in  order  to  pursue  its  targets  in  a 
shorter period of time.  
34  Europe  and  the  USA  have  slowly  moved  to  introduce  tough  regulation  in  this  field. 
Remarkable is the new position of the IMF, which now advocates exceptional and limited 
direct controls of capital move ments, reversing the pro free market position adopted in the 
previous 40 years (IMF, 2012). 
35 We refer to the assumptions that lead to full inter-temporal consumption smoothing – such as 
perfect foresight or rational expectations, infinitely-living agents, altruism, absence of liquidity 
constraint, etc. – and limit effectiveness of fiscal policy. As to the possible negative impact on 
real  activity  of  imperfections  in  financial  markets,  see  Bernanke,  Gertler  (1989,  1990); 
Greenwald,  Stiglitz  (1988,  1990,  1993),  Kiyotaki,  Moore  (1997,  2002);  Bernanke,  Gertler, 
Gilchrist (1999) and a lot more recent contributions.  
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unions  (Acocella,  Di  Bartolomeo  and  Tirelli,  2007a;  2007b);
  36  critique  of  the 
Friedman  rule  and  the  need  for  an  inflation  target  well  above  zero  (Tirelli,  Di 
Bartolomeo and Acocella, 2010)
37.  
We have omitted from the above sketch of the reversal in most convictions of 
some  decades  ago  any  me ntion  of  issues  concerning  the  effects  of  fiscal 
variables. This is not because they are scarcely relevant. Quite the contrary, they 
deserve  specific  attention,  as  they  had  an  influence  not  only  on  the  initial 
institutional set up, and thus on the manageme nt of the public debt crisis,
38 but 
also, more recently, on the strengthening of previous rules (the introduction of a 
fiscal compact), that might prelude to further problems in the future. The next sub-
section will deal with the former issue. We defer discussion of the latter to section 
7. 
 
 
6.2. The issue of multipliers and fiscal policy 
 
Doubts with respect to some tenets of the assertion of very low spending and tax 
multipliers  were  first  raised  by  Blanchard,  Perotti  (2002),  which  gave  a 
substantially Keynesian answer to the issue of the effects of tax and expenditure 
increases on income. In fact, they found that the former have a contractionary 
effect, while the latter have an expansionary one. The authors did not engage in a 
discussion about debt consolidation strategies, but one could hardly assert that, 
on the basis of their findings a policy of expenditure reductions and (to a less 
extent)  of  tax  increases,  while  certainly  contributing  to  the  reduction  of  the 
numerator  of  the  debt/GDP  ratio,  would  give  an  impulse  to  the  denominator. 
Instead,  their  findings  might  support  a  Keynesian-type  attitude  of  debt 
consolidation not based on a budget contraction, at least in so far as the effects 
on income are concerned. 
Again,  of  specific  relevance  are  some  analyses  that  take  account  of  open 
economies (in some cases the EMU) and spillover effects. In order to quantify 
these  effects, Coenen, Wieland (2002) constructed a small macro-econometric 
model of the USA, the Euro area and Japan and found that international spillovers 
                                                           
36  The  validity  of  the  conclusions  of  Beetsma,  Bovenberg  (1998)  strictly  depends  on  their 
assumption  of  absence  of  labour  markets  distortions  (Acocella,  Di  Bartolomeo  and  Tirelli, 
2007b).  More  specifically,  when  trade  unions  operate  fiscal  coordination  ensures  better 
outcomes  with  a  conservative  central  bank,  while  being  detrimental  with  a  populist  one 
(Acocella,  Di  Bartolomeo  and  Tirelli,  2007a),  which  is  paradoxical  with  respect  to  the 
institutional arrangements of the EMU. 
37 To be sure, there are analysts thinking that after thirty years of successful anti -inflationary 
action  by  central  banks,  the  advantages  of  anchoring  businesses  and  households’ 
expectations at price stability should not be lost (Kohn, 2010). Accepting the argument of the 
beneficial effects of anchoring inflation expectation, however, does not rule out choosing a 
moderately higher inflation rate target, as this would not impair expectations anchoring, while 
having a significant positive impact on unemployment and growth, especially in the EMU. 
38  Think of prescriptions for the management of the crisis and the conditions imposed on 
countries in need of financial assistance from the EMU and the IMF.  
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of domestic shocks turn out to be rather small when exchange rates are flexible 
and  short-term  interest  rates  are  set  according  to  policy  rules  that  focus  on 
stabilizing  domestic  variables.  Beetsma  et  al.  (2006)  combined  a  panel  VAR 
model in government spending, net taxes and GDP with a panel trade model. 
They found that a public spending increase (tax reduction) equal to 1% of GDP 
implies 2.3% (0.6%) more foreign exports over the first two years, on average. If 
Germany  initiates  such  budget  change,  the  effect  on  the  GDP  of  its  trading 
partners is 0.23% (0.06%) over the first two years. These figures are likely to 
indicate lower bounds for the effects that will actually occur (Beetsma et al., 2006). 
Beetsma et al. (2008) found that a 1% of GDP public spending impulse produces 
a 1.2% output rise on impact and a 1.6% peak response of output. In addition, 
rising  imports  and  falling  exports  together  produce  an  impact  fall  of  the  trade 
balance  of  0.5%  of  GDP  and  a peak  fall  of  0.8%  of  GDP.  The  public  budget 
moves into a deficit of 0.7% of GDP on impact. Similar results are in Beetsma, 
Giuliodori’s (2011)
39 estimation of the effects of government purchases on income 
in open European economies, which are higher than one on average in the short- 
to medium-run. The public and trade balance deteriorate. Even if the value of the 
multiplier  is  greater  than  one,  it  is  reduced  in  open  economies  because  of 
leakages.  This  strengthens  the  rationale  behind  a  concerted  fiscal  expansion 
among European countries and, by contrast, implies that decisions to introduce 
fiscal discipline – either independently decided by a country or imposed by some 
common rule – have cumulative negative effects that may impair reaching the 
target of a reduction in the debt/GDP ratio.  
Recent analyses have shown that the value of multipliers is strictly dependent 
on the time of reference of the effects as well as on the state of the economy. 
A  rather  complete  and  detailed  empirical  analysis  of  the  effects  of  fiscal 
consolidation is in IMF (2010), which takes account of numerous aspects of the 
effects of fiscal consolidation policies: in particular, their timing (i.e., whether they 
are  short-  or  long-term),  the  monetary  policy  stance,  the  expansionary  or 
contractionary nature of budget policies of other countries. Its conclusion is that, 
first, ‘the idea that fiscal austerity triggers faster growth in the short term finds little 
support in the data. Fiscal retrenchment typically has contractionary short-term 
effects on economic activity, with lower output and higher unemployment…, (but) 
fiscal  consolidation  is likely  to  be beneficial  over  the long  term’.  In  addition, a 
budget cut is the less expansionary the lower the interest rate (as monetary policy 
has little room for partially accommodating their deflationary effects), the lower the 
likelihood of a currency depreciation and the less expansionary are the policies of 
other countries, which gives little scope for raising net export.  
Of  a  similar  nature  is  the  result  of  more  recent  theoretical  and  empirical 
research. Some point out that smoother fiscal consolidations are more successful 
than stiffer ones (Batini, Callegari, Melina, 2012). Other studies stress the efficacy 
of fiscal policy in severely depressed economies when central banks do not offset 
its effects (DeLong, Summers, 2012). Blanchard, Leigh (2013). More generally, 
                                                           
39 This paper also offers a good review of the results of existing empirical tests.  
 
19 
 
fiscal  multipliers  are  shown  to  be  asymmetric  and  regime-dependent,  ‘being 
stronger in recessions than in expansions, in particular in presence of financial 
market stress, so that contractionary effects can become very severe when fiscal 
consolidations are pursued’ (Semmler, Semmler, 2013: 2), as an effect either of 
some  economies  being  locked  in  a  bad  equilibrium  (De  Grauwe,  2011)  or  of 
macroeconomic  non-linearities  (Semmler,  Semmler,  2013).  This  result  is 
confirmed by the analysis of seven structural DSGE models used for policy action 
as well as two academic DSGE models (Coenen et al, 2012). The analysis shows, 
however,  that  a  permanent  fiscal  stimulus  implies  lower  values  of  the  initial 
multipliers  and  a  negative  impact  on  income  in  the  long  run.  Finally, 
Papadimitriou,  Nikiforos  and  Zezza  (2013)  find  a  multiplier  of  2.5,  capable  of 
explaining  the  failure  of  the  ‘Troika’  expansionary  contraction  prescriptions  for 
Greece. 
These findings have important consequences for our topic, in so far as both 
institutional and short run implications are concerned. We will briefly deal with the 
former in the next sub-section and with the latter in section 7.  
 
 
6.3. Inconsistency of the EMU institutions and alternative institutions 
 
The high value of multipliers in open economies strengthens the rationale behind 
a concerted fiscal expansion among European countries and, by contrast, imply 
that decisions to introduce fiscal discipline – either decentralized of imposed by 
some common rule such as the SGP – have cumulative negative effects that may 
impair reaching the target of a reduction in the deficit and debt/GDP ratios, at least 
in the short run. By paraphrasing Auerbach, Gorodnichenko’s (2012: 17) words, 
coordinated ‘fiscal activism may be more valuable than previously thought’. 
In addition, the foundations of the SGP (later on, also of the fiscal compact) are 
weakened by reconsideration of the issue of the relationship between fiscal and 
monetary  action  in  the  Union.  We  have  seen  above  that  the  validity  of  the 
conclusions of Beetsma, Bovenberg (1998) strictly depends on their assumption 
of  absence  of  labour  markets  distortions  (Acocella,  Di  Bartolomeo  and  Tirelli, 
2007b). More specifically, when trade unions operate, fiscal coordination ensures 
better outcomes with a conservative central bank, while being detrimental with a 
populist one (Acocella, Di Bartolomeo and Tirelli, 2007a), which is paradoxical 
with respect to the institutional arrangements of the EMU. 
 
 
7.  INSTITUTIONS  AND  POLICIES  IN  TIME  OF  CRISIS:  SHORT-  AND  LONG-RUN  EFFECTS  OF  FISCAL 
CONSOLIDATION  
 
Variability and regime-dependency of multipliers make it necessary to distinguish 
between the different possible aims of fiscal action. If the aim is that of expanding 
the economy, a short-run multiplier larger than one is enough to suggest the need 
for  an  expansionary  fiscal  action.  This  should  have  no  negative  effect  on  the  
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deficit- and debt-to-Gdp ratios, in the short run. On the contrary, the effect on 
these should be positive. Thus the idea of an expansionary fiscal consolidation 
(the doctrine of ‘expansionary austerity’) that was at the basis of exit policies from 
the crisis in Japan in 1996 and more recently in the EMU has been disproved the 
‘new’ conventional wisdom among economists that inspired a number of policy 
attitudes and interventions in the last couple of decades 
Variability of multipliers does not guarantee, however, that the effect of fiscal 
expansion is positive also in the long run. In so far as this context is considered, a 
necessary and sufficient condition for an expansionary fiscal consolidation to lead 
to a reduced debt/Gdp ratio in the long run is that the multiplier is higher than the 
inverse of this ratio (Cozzi, 2013; Nuti, 2013). This is especially good news for 
highly indebted countries, as it widens the range of the values of multipliers that 
make for expansionary fiscal policy to reduce the debt/Gdp ratio. For a country 
such  as  Italy,  a  value  higher  than  .7  would  be  enough  to  suggest  a  fiscal 
expansionary action as an instrument of fiscal ‘consolidation’. However, one must 
be sure that the multiplier considered is a long-run, not a short-run, one. 
This may not be the case for Italy, and – changing what needs to be changed – 
for other European countries as well. However, a two-stage exit strategy could be 
followed within the EMU. In the first stage, a coordinated fiscal stimulus could 
raise  the  Union’s  GDP  and  alleviate  the  negative  effects  of  the  crisis.  As  the 
positive effects of the stimulus fade away, the phase of consolidating public debt 
could follow, either through more traditional policies or by revising other aspects of 
the EMU institutional set-up
40.  
 
 
8. WHY  ARE  EUROPEAN  POLICYMAKERS  STILL  SLAVES  OF  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  FASHIONABLE  IN  THE 
SEVENTIES? PHYSIOLOGICAL LAGS AND PERVERSE TIES.  
 
Differently from the United States, neither the theoretical progress of the 1990s 
and the following decade nor the depth of the crisis that has hit the EMU countries 
have produced a substantial change in the institutional architecture of EMU and 
current  policy  attitudes.  The  deflationary  bias  of  the  former  has  even  been 
stressed by introducing a ‘fiscal compact’.
 41   
Policy actions only partly depend on economic theory. There are a number of 
factors  explaining  why  theoretical  innovations  may  not  translate  into  adopted 
policies (see, e.g., Galbraith, 1987). Vested interests and some autonomy in the 
dynamics of political orientations can contribute to that.  
                                                           
40 An issue different from that of the effects of the value of multipliers for the desirability of a 
contractionary or an expansionary fiscal stance is that of the effects of the debt/gdp ratio on 
optimal growth. On this issue, see Checherita, Hughes Hallett, Rother (2014).  
41 From this point of view Rip van Winkle would certainly not be hit by the institutional changes 
introduced in the EMU. He could still declar e himself a convinced supporter of the theories 
asserted by Friedman or Barro, Lucas, Sargent Wallace, without repeating an ‘environmental’ 
mistake.  
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Hinting  at  the  role  of  interests  of  different  EMU  countries  may  be  useful. 
Germany  has  created  a  system  powerful  enough  not  to  suffer  from  the 
deflationary  bias  of  the  EMU  institutions,  because  of  the  real  devaluation  it 
operated since the 1990s, in particular in the early 2000s, and its ability to build a 
successful system to compete in Europe (and to some extent outside the area). 
By contrast, peripheral countries (most of the PIIGS) still think that they may draw 
some profit from the external constraint of fixed exchange rates and other EMU 
institutions.  They  might  like  reforming  some  of  these  institutions  but  are  not 
powerful  enough  to  counter  German  opposition.  This  help  explain  why  they 
accepted  a  number  of  institutional  changes,  among  which  the  incredibly 
asymmetric provisions of the Macroeconomic imbalance procedure introduced in 
2011, which has been tailored to the German interests
42. Fragmentation between 
the different European countries is thus rising, even if it appears to be repressed, 
until now. 
The performance of EMU countries since the institution of the euro has be en 
worse  than  that  of  European  non -EMU  countries  at  a  comparable  stage  of 
development  (i.e.,  Denmark,  Sweden  and  UK),  in  terms  not  only  of  the 
unemployment rate and the GDP rate of growth, but also of inflation. These 
countries benefitted from flexible exchange rates and, in the case of the Bank of 
England, don’t have a political independent and conservative central bank. To be 
fair, the economic performance of non-EMU countries had been already better 
before 1999, but the EMU has only succeeded in reducing the gap in terms of 
price stability, at the expenses of higher growth- and unemployment-rate gaps 
(see table 1).  
 
Table 1. A comparison of growth, unemployment and inflation rates, EMU and 
European non-EMU countries, 1991-2012 
 
GDP % growth rates at constant prices   1991-98  1999-2012 
   EMU       1.8        1.3 
   DK, SW, UK       1.9        1.7 
Unemployment rates (%)     
   EMU      10.4        8.9 
   DK, SW, UK        7.9        6.0 
Inflation rates (Consumer price index, %)     
   EMU        3.1        2.1 
   DK, SW, UK          2.6        2.0 
Source: European Commission (2013 and various years)     
 
The most recent economic evolution and the depth of the crisis seem to have an 
influence  on  political  attitudes.  The  level  of  unemployment  is  still  climbing 
everywhere  in  Europe.  France,  the  Netherlands  and  other  formerly  virtuous 
countries are facing rather serious difficulties that have led also to a deterioration 
                                                           
42 Bibow is very specific in that. See in particular Bibow (2012: 25, footnote 5).  
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of the deficit/GDP ratio. A very dangerous situation is thus emerging that might be 
a  prelude  to  a  vast  authoritarian  attitude  throughout  Europe.  This  might  help 
explain why Germany could accept some attenuation of its tough stance.  
 
 
9. INSTITUTIONS, EXIT POLICIES AND THE ‘GREAT RECESSION’: SOME LESSONS AS A WAY OF CONCLUSIONS 
The  evolution  of  economic  thought  can  contribute  to  explain  the  differences 
between the policies that were adopted on the two sides of the Atlantic through its 
influence on the respective institutions. American institutions were to some extent 
influenced by Keynesian thought and the innovations introduced in the decades 
immediately following the second half of the 1960s had an impact mainly on actual 
policies,  not  on  the  institutional  framing.  The  Employment  Act  of  1946  made 
promoting employment a target of the Federal government. In so far as monetary 
policy  is concerned,  the Federal  Reserve Reform  Act  of 1977  added  the dual 
mandate of ensuring employment together with price stability to the original target 
of preserving financial stability
43, thus not being much influenced by the diffuse 
concern over inflation and the theoretical innovations of those years. By contrast, 
EMU institutions were built under the influence of those innovations.  
Time has passed which should have led to a radical change of most of the still 
current institutional architecture, but a sort of hysteresis is in place. This has a 
number of possible explanations, such as those underlined by Galbraith (1987). 
However,  in  order  to  explain  it  one  should  refer  not  only  to  normal  and 
physiological lags, but also the opposing interests, the value judgments and 
visions prevailing in some European countries and the dominant role of Germany, 
which conveys them. 
Beyond differences between the USA and the EMU, however, some common 
issues arising from the effects of the crisis and the policies adopted to tame it 
should be stressed. Both new risks and new opportunities arise. 
First, the current level of long-term interest rates is presently negative (Turner, 
2012: 11) as an effect of the liquidity glut. This raises the risk of speculative 
bubbles. Interest rates will certainly increase in the near future. If this does n ot 
take place smoothly, financial risks will arise threatening again the real economy.  
At the same time, negative long -term interest rates are the effect of the huge 
amount of long-term government bonds held by central banks as a consequence 
of  their  unco nventional  operations.  This  empowers  central  banks  with  an 
additional policy tool to control expectations and choose among multiple equilibria 
by targeting both short- and long-term interest rates (Adão et al, 2011)
44. 
It is certainly difficult to manage policy action and revive economic prospects in 
a situation where interest rates hit the zero -lower boundary and the debt/Gdp 
ratios are climbing. Devising new policies or re-discovering old routes as a way to 
cope with the new situation is a challenging pros pect. Slightly rising the current 
                                                           
43 Bernanke (2013). 
44 For a review of possible consequences of these operations see International Monetary Fund 
(2013).  
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inflationary  targets,  redistributing  wealth,  adopting  a  co-ordinated  expansionary 
policy design, both within countries (regions) and among them, are some of the 
most obvious such policies. 
The reasons for co-ordinated policy action should be stressed and detailed. First 
the  dividing  line  between  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  has  been  blurred  (Iwata, 
2012) and the reasons in favour of political independence of central banks and for 
assigning them an anti-inflationary target seem to be much less founded now than 
some decades ago. In addition, as shown before, the advantages of their political 
independence have largely failed to materialize in practice, as the performance of 
the economy in countries with independent and conservative central banks has 
not  been  better  than  elsewhere.  Moreover,  high  debt/Gdp  ratios  can  make 
independent  monetary  policy  financially  destabilizing.  For  this  reason,  in 
particular, central banks cannot be assigned the function of a lender of last resort 
for the private sector while being excluded from a similar function in favour of the 
public  sector.  Finally,  policy  decentralization  consistent  with  the  appropriate 
assignment of instruments to targets fails to produce net benefits ‘in a complex 
non-linear system with risk — including instrument uncertainty – and where one is 
concerned not just with the ultimate equilibrium (which in practice may never be 
attained) but with real-time performance, one should use all the instruments at 
one's disposal, and coordination among policymakers is essential’ (Stiglitz, 2013a: 
15).  
Co-ordinated policy action has an international counterpart. Globalization has 
made international linkages more copious and stronger. On the one side, this has 
generally reduced the effectiveness of national policies. On the other, the need for 
international co-operation has increased. Defection from agreed targets is always 
advantageous, more so for small countries, but larger countries have powerful 
weapons to discourage it. The true problem lies in the interests pressing for free 
trade and capital movements inside these countries.  
Some of the previous considerations are of special relevance in the case of the 
EMU. The list of targets attributed to the existing institutions needs no addition, 
but the weights attached to each of them should certainly be revised, beginning 
with the ECB targets. As to instruments, a lot are missing, notably active, co-
ordinated (across states) fiscal policy as well as common industrial policy and 
labour policy, i.e. all the instruments that empower a federal state. A final notation 
has to do with improper assignment of instrument to targets, that of monetary 
policy for structural changes (Hetzel, 2013)
45, which was the  unsuccessful way 
devised by  the founders of th e EMU for coping with the structural differences 
existing among the member countries. 
 
 
                                                           
45 A parallel could be drawn with the Federal Reserve’s improper attempt to offset the negative 
effects  of  growing  inequality  by  lowering  interest  rates  and  relaxing  regulations,  thereby 
helping create a housing bubble (Stiglitz, 2013). In the case of the Fed, at least the set of 
statutory targets is larger than that of the ECB. Then the latter’s attempt to pursue structural 
targets is even more striking.  
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